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OPINION OF THE COURT
McKee, Circuit Judge.
Joseph Aruanno appeals the order of the district court granting summary judgment
to each group of defendants on the suit he instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
defendants include licensed psychiatrists and members of Treatment Review Committees
in two state prisons. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm, although we do so on a
different basis than that relied on by the district court.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not recite the facts or
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procedural background of this case except insofar as may be helpful to our discussion.
Aruanno maintains that there was not a sufficient medical basis for Brandoff’s
initial decision to prescribe antipsychotic drugs, or for later decisions, involving the
remaining appellees, to continue or renew this line of treatment. He contends that his
sworn testimony about retaliation for persisting in litigation against the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”), together with his extensive medical records and
the decisions of various treating psychiatrists, raise genuine issues of material fact that
preclude summary judgment for the defendants.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review of the district court’s award of summary judgment. Abramson v. William
Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001). We apply the same standard that the
district court should have applied. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278
(3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriately awarded “against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We, of course, draw all inferences from the
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pennsylvania Coal
Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).
The district court grounded its analysis in substantive due process. See Aruanno v.
Glazman, 2007 WL 1221113, at *6 (D. N.J., Apr. 20, 2007). In analyzing the significant
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liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs identified in
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990), the district court also noted the
limits of the right to refuse treatment. “[A] prison may compel a prisoner to accept
treatment when prison officials, in the exercise of professional judgment, deem it
necessary to carry out valid medical or penological objectives.” White v. Napoleon, 897
F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the decision of a medical professional to
force medicate a prisoner is presumed valid, "unless it is shown to be such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such judgment." Id.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
resulting from deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To demonstrate deliberate indifference, Aruanno must
show that the appellees possessed a subjective appreciation of an excessive risk to his
safety, and nevertheless chose to disregard that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837-38 (1994). Aruanno contends that, given the absence of evidence that he would harm
himself or others, forced medication was unwarranted.
Thus, whether we view his claim as an Eighth Amendment claim based on the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, or as a substantive due process claim,
Aruanno can not survive the defendants’ motion for summary judgment absent expert
testimony that would dispute the defendants’ assertions that the treatment he received was
medically necessary. Since Aruanno’s Amended Complaint and his arguments on appeal
4

mention only his Eighth Amendment claims, our analysis will be focused on that claim.
However, we would reach the same result if we viewed this as a claim for denial of
substantive due process as the district court did.
In Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1987), we held that a prisoner's
Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires
expert testimony when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay
person. Id. at 473-74. In Montomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492 (3d Cir. 2002), we further
highlighted the inherent challenges that arise from a litigant attempting to provide his/her
own explanation of complicated medical symptoms, consequences, and treatment
decisions. Id. at 504 (citing the differences between witness testimony about a broken leg
or a bullet wound versus the effects of heart failure and HIV medication). Medical
testimony is needed in such cases to assist the factfinder in understanding the case and
assessing the quality of medical care received.
Aruanno’s case encompasses almost 2,000 pages of complex psychiatric
observations and the opinions of dozens of medical professionals over several years. It is
inconceivable that a layperson could evaluate this case without expert guidance. The
district court addressed that concern by authorizing the funds required for Aruanno to hire
an expert who could evaluate the medical evidence in this case. Aruanno was certainly
within his right not to use the expert that was authorized; but his failure to use any expert
leaves a fatal void in his case that can not be overcome with only his sworn statement
about threats from prison officials.
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Moreover, the record reveals an effort on the part of his treating psychiatrists to be
responsive to his reactions to his medication where possible. On numerous occasions
since the initial September 2002 order, the dose of his prescription for Risperdal was
lowered; it was also offered without an additional antidepressant, temporarily substituted
with another drug, and eventually discontinued. The medical basis for each decision,
along with Aruanno’s physical and mental responses to the changes, were carefully
documented. While it may be theoretically possible that such judgments somehow
resulted from deliberate indifference, as Aruanno argues, there is nothing on this record to
support that claim. Indeed, the unchallenged testimony of the defendants is to the
contrary.
Therefore, Aruanno has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
appellees’ decision to forcibly medicate him constituted deliberate indifference to his
medical needs.

III.
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the order of the district court granting
summary judgment to the appellees.
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